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Abstract
The last decade has shown an increasing interest in the use of the physically
unclonable function (PUF) technology in the design of radio frequency identifica-
tion (RFID) systems. PUFs can bring extra security and privacy at the physical level
that cannot be obtained by symmetric or asymmetric cryptography at the moment.
However, many PUF-based RFID schemes proposed in recent years do not even
achieve the lowest privacy level in reputable security and privacy models, such as
Vaudenay’s model. In contrast, the lowest privacy in this model can be achieved
through standard RFID schemes that use only symmetric cryptography. The pur-
pose of this chapter is to analyze this aspect. Thus, it is emphasized the need to use
formal models in the study of the security and privacy of (PUF-based) RFID
schemes. We broadly discuss the tag corruption oracle and highlight some aspects
that can lead to schemes without security or privacy. We also insist on the need to
formally treat the cryptographic properties of PUFs to obtain security and privacy
proofs. In the end, we point out a significant benefit of using PUF technology in
RFID, namely getting schemes that offer destructive privacy in Vaudenay’s model.
Keywords: Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), Physically Unclonable
Function (PUF), security, privacy
1. Introduction
Although the roots of the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology can
be traced back to World War II, the ancestor of modern RFID technology was
introduced by Cardullo and Parks in 1973 [1] when the two proposed a passive radio
transponder with memory. In recent years, RFID technology has become increas-
ingly popular and its applicability has expanded to more and more diverse and
complex domains and systems. It is worth mentioning here process automation,
tracking and identification, toll collection, public transportation, national IDs and
passports, medical healthcare systems, pharmaceutical systems, and so on.
From a scientific point of view, RFID has become a well-defined research field,
counting more than fifteen thousand scientific papers and books indexed by IEEE,
Springer, and Elsevier, and more than twenty-two thousand patents or patent
applications indexed by the most essential three regional patent databases (USA,
Europe, and Japan) [2]. All of these highlight a rich palette of research directions in
RFID technology, such as: system implementation, design principles, chipless
implementations, IoT integration, security, and so on.
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An interesting aspect is that most of the RFID references cover technical aspects,
applications, and protocol design, very few addressing security and privacy issues.
The conclusion is that very few research papers dealing with RFID implementation
or application start with security and privacy in mind. Obviously, there are RFID
applications for which security and privacy are not so vital, such as human activity
recognition (e.g., smart gym), environmental corrosive monitoring, soil monitor-
ing, and so on. However, for other fields like people identification or healthcare
systems [3, 4], security and privacy are crucial issues.
Attempts to improve the authentication process in RFID systems or make
them resistant to physical attacks (tag corruption, for example) have led to the
need to insert unclonable or tamper-evident physical objects into tags.
Unclonability offers unique fingerprints to tags, while the tamper-evidence
property would protect against corruption. Thus, physically unclonable functions
(PUFs) [5–7] have found themself a suitable application in RFID technology and the
researchers have already proposed a large spectrum of PUF-based RFID systems.
However, the inclusion of PUFs in RFID systems (especially on tags) raises two key
questions:
1.Are PUFs more efficient in implementation than ordinary cryptographic
primitives?
2.Do PUFs provide security and privacy that standard cryptographic primitives
cannot provide?
As with respect to the first question it is worth noting that an RFID implemen-
tation with strong security properties comes with increased cost for the final RFID
product. This is the reason why some authors take into account the concept of cost-
effective protocol [8]. As discussed in [9], the installation costs of current RFID
solutions, not necessarily with improved hardware security, are not cheap at all,
many different costs being involved when installing an RFID system (including
maintenance and training).
As with respect to the second question, PUFs certainly offer security features
that standard cryptographic primitives cannot provide. But if these security fea-
tures are not used in a corresponding way, the result may be worse than if PUFs are
not included. The lack of understanding of such issues has led many authors to
propose PUF-based RFID schemes that are insecure or not at all private [10, 11]
when analyzed in reputable models such as Vaudenay’s security and privacy model
[12, 13].
In this chapter, we want to highlight:
• The need to use PUFs in the construction of secure and private RFID schemes;
• The need to formalize the properties of PUFs to achieve provable security;
• The erroneous use of PUFs that does nothing but lead to insecure schemes and
a lack of privacy.
The whole discussion is conducted on Vaudenay’s security and privacy model.
This model is currently considered one of the best RFID security and privacy
models, offering a classification of the privacy of RFID schemes into eight classes. It
is known that the strong privacy class cannot be obtained in this model, while the
destructive privacy class can be obtained by using the PUF technology. This gives us
an excellent example that justifies the opportunity to use PUFs in RFID technology.
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2. RFID schemes and systems
An RFID system [14, 15] consists of a reader, a set of tags, and a communication
protocol between reader and tags. The reader is a transceiver1 that is connected
through a secure channel with a back-end server, which is a powerful device that
maintains a database with tag information. The reader’s task is to identify legitimate
tags (that is, tags with information stored in its database) and to reject all other
incoming communication. The reader and its database are trusted entities, and the
communication between them is secure. Many RFID protocols proposed so far do
not make any separation between the reader and the back-end server. For this
reason, the back-end server functions are considered to be taken over by the reader
and, as a result, the reader is considered a powerful device not computationally
restricted that can perform any cryptographic operation.
Opposite the reader, tags are small transponder2 devices that are considered to
be resource constrained. Depending on their class, they can perform only logical
operations, symmetric encryption, or even public key cryptography. In practical
scenarios, tags are attached to various items or carried by persons in order to
facilitate some services when they are identified by readers.
The memory of a tag is typically split into permanent (or internal) and temporary
(or volatile). The permanent memory stores the state values of the tag, while the
temporary memory can be viewed as a set of temporary variables used to carry out
the calculations required by the communication protocol. There are two types of
temporary variables:
1. local temporary variables, used by tags only to do computations in a given
protocol step;
2.global temporary variables. These get values in a given protocol step to be used
in another protocol step.
From a formal point of view, an RFID scheme is defined as follows. Let R be a
reader identifier and T be a set of tag identifierswhose cardinal is polynomial in some
security parameter3 λ. An RFID scheme over R ,T
 
[12, 13] is a triple S ¼
SetupR, SetupT, Identð Þ of probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms4, where:
1.SetupR λð Þ inputs a security parameter λ and outputs a triple pk, sk,DBð Þ
consisting of a key pair pk, skð Þ and an empty database DB. pk is public, while
sk is kept secret by reader;
2.SetupT pk, IDð Þ initializes the tag identified by ID. It outputs an initial tag
state S and a tag specific secret K. The pair ID,Kð Þ is stored in the reader’s
database DB;
1 Contraction from transmitter and receiver.
2 Contraction from transmitter and responder.
3 A security parameter usually specifies a minimum security value, such as the minimum length of an
encryption key.
4 A probabilistic (or randomized) algorithm is an algorithm that uses uniformly random bits as an
auxiliary input to guide its behavior, in the hope of achieving good performance in the “average case”
over all possible choices of random bits. A polynomial time algorithm is an algorithm that runs in
polynomial time with respect to the size of its input.
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3. Ident pk;R sk,DBð Þ; ID Sð Þð Þ is an interactive protocol between the reader
identified by R (with its private key sk and database DB) and a tag identified
by ID (with its state S) in which the reader ends with an output consisting of
ID or a special symbol ⊥. The tag may end with no output (unilateral
authentication), or it may end with an output consisting of OK or ⊥ (mutual
authentication).
By calling SetupR λð Þ one should understand that a reader identified by R is
created, initialized, and some public parameters of the system are also established.
We simply refer to the reader such created as being R . By calling SetupT pk, IDð Þ, a
tag identified by ID is created, initialized, and registered with the reader by storing
some information about it in DB. We denote this tag by T ID. The meaning of the
reader’s output ID (⊥) is that it authenticates (rejects) the tag. Similarly, the tag
outputs OK (⊥) when it authenticates (rejects) the reader.
The correctness of an RFID scheme means that regardless of how the system is set
up, after each complete execution of the interactive protocol between the reader
and a legitimate tag, the reader outputs the tag’s identity with overwhelming prob-
ability. For mutual authentication, correctness asks for one more requirement,
namely that the tag outputs OK with overwhelming probability.
An RFID system is an instantiation of an RFID scheme. This is done by a trusted
operator ℐ who runs the RFID scheme over a reader identifier R and a set T of tag
identifiers. In a given setting, the reader is initialized exactly once, while each tag at
most once. Thus, the reader’s database does not store multiple entries for the same
tag. However, different settings with the same RFID scheme may initialize the
reader and the tags in different ways.
We close the section by an example of a fundamental RFID scheme, namely the
PRF-based RFID scheme proposed in [13]. To describe the scheme, let us assume
that λ is a security parameter, ℓ1 λð Þ and ℓ2 λð Þ are two polynomials, and F ¼
FKð ÞK ∈K is a pseudo-random function
5 (PRF), where FK : 0, 1f g
2ℓ1 λð Þ ! 0, 1f gℓ2 λð Þ for
all K ∈K .
Each tag is equipped with a random key K and has the capacity to compute FK .
The reader maintains a database DB with entries for all legitimate tags. Each
entry is a vector ID,Kð Þ, where ID is the tag’s identity and K is its random key.
The protocol is given in Figure 1 (the use of “ ” specifies a random selection
of an element from a set). As we can see, the reader sends initially a random
Figure 1.
PRF-based RFID scheme.
5 A pseudo-random function is a collection F ¼ FKð ÞK of efficiently-computable functions with the
property that no efficient algorithm can distinguish (with significant probability) between a function
chosen randomly from this family and a random function (a function whose outputs are fixed at
random).
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x 0, 1f gℓ1 λð Þ to the tag. On receiving it, the tag generates a random y 0, 1f gℓ1 λð Þ,
computes z ¼ FK x, yð Þ, and answers with y, zð Þ. The reader checks its database for a
pair ID,Kð Þ such that z ¼ FK x, yð Þ. If such a pair is found, it outputs ID (that is,
authenticates the tag); otherwise, outputs ⊥.
3. Security and privacy models for RFID
The design of an RFID scheme must start from consistent motivations for its
usefulness and the desired security and privacy level, in a particular model of
security and privacy, for the scheme to be proposed. The second desideratum
requires that proofs of security and privacy accompany the proposed scheme.
Ideally, the scheme designer should know in advance security and privacy models
for RFID schemes and thus to offer his scheme in such a model. However, the
practice shows that, although various fairly good security and privacy models have
been proposed over time, many authors propose RFID schemes for which they
study security and privacy in an ad hoc way without referring to the existing
models. It is not surprising then that many of these schemes, analyzed in reputable
models, do not reach the lowest level of security or privacy [11].
In this section, we aim to discuss one of the most critical security and privacy
models for RFID, namely Vaudenay’s model. We argue that this model falls into the
class of gray-box models, and then make a consistent analysis of the corruption
oracle in this model. The emphasis on this oracle is more than necessary, both for
ordinary tags and for tags endowed with physically unclonable functions.
The discussion in this section can also be rephrased for other models that offer
the corruption ability to the adversary, such as the model based on indistinguish-
ability proposed in [16]. However, the choice of Vaudenay’s model for the discus-
sion in this chapter is a matter of the authors’scientific taste and their belief that it is
one of the fundamental models for studying security and privacy properties of RFID
schemes.
3.1 Security and privacy models
A security or privacy model for a cryptographic construction consists of an attack
model and a security or privacy goal, respectively. The attack model specifies the
adversary’s power, while the security or privacy goal specifies the property we are
interested to be achieved by the cryptographic construction. Nowadays, researchers
differentiate between three attack models [17]:
1.The black-box model: this is the traditional model where the adversary can only
observe the response of the cryptographic construction when it is queried by
inputs of the adversary’s choice (the adversary may know the algorithms used
in the cryptographic construction);
2.The gray-box model: this includes the black-box model and supplementary the
adversary may use side-channel information such as power consumption,
electro-magnetic radiation, or timing information;
3.The white-box model: this has been introduced in particular for software
implementation of the cryptographic constructions. In this model, the
adversary is assumed to have full control over the implementation and its
execution environment.
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For instance, the security model IND-CCA means that the security goal is indis-
tinguishability (semantic security) and the attack model is the chosen ciphertext attack
[18]. The power of the adversary in this model is specified by giving him access to
an encryption and decryption oracles that assists the adversary to collect a polynomial
size set of (plaintext,ciphertext) pairs.
The black-box model does not depend on the software or hardware
implementation, platform, and so on. In contrast to it, the gray-box model of attack
exploits the algorithm/protocol implementation. For instance, the side-channel
analysis that can be used with this model may take into account fluctuations in
timing delays, power consumption, or emitted signals and radiation [19]. The
result of such an analysis varies depending on the implementation, the platform on
which it is implemented, the measuring devices. Side-channel analysis is local and
not global.
3.2 Vaudenay’s RFID security and privacy model
One of the most influential security and privacy model for RFID is Vaudenay’s
model [12, 13]. In this model, the adversary is a PPT algorithm that is allowed to
interact with the RFID scheme. This means that the adversary may create tags to
play with them as being the reader (but without having direct access to the reader’s
database). The adversary may also play with the reader as being any of the tags
created by it. Depending on the adversary, it may or may not have access to the
tags’ internal memory. From a formal point of view, the adversary interacts with
the RFID scheme by means of a set of oracles. Before describing these oracles, we
mention that each tag in Vaudenay’s model is either free (i.e., outside the interaction
area of the adversary) or drawn (i.e., in the interaction area of the adversary).
When a tag is created, it is free. The adversary may draw a free tag at any time and,
in the end, to free it.
Now, the oracles in Vaudenay’s model are the following:
1.CreateTagb IDð Þ: When the adversary queries this oracle by ID for some
bit b, the oracle calls the algorithm SetupT pk, IDð Þ to generate a pair
K, Sð Þ and create a tag T ID with the identifier ID and initial state S.
If b ¼ 1, ID,Kð Þ is added to DB and the tag is considered legitimate;
otherwise (b ¼ 0), the tag is considered illegitimate. The tag thus created is
considered free;
2.DrawTag δð Þ: By this oracle, the adversary is allowed to interact with free tags
according to some probability distribution δ (on these tags). Therefore, this
oracle chooses a number of free tags according to δ, let us say n, generates n
temporary identities vtag1, … , vtagn, and outputs vtag1, b1, … , vtagn, bn
 
,
where bi specifies whether the tag vtagi is legitimate or not. All these tags are
considered now drawn.
As one can see, DrawTag provides the adversary with access to some free tags by
means of temporary identifiers, and gives information on whether the tags are
legitimate or not (but no other information);
3.Free vtagð Þ: By this oracle, the adversary may free the drawn tag vtag. The
identifier vtag will no longer be used. We assume that when a tag is freed, its
temporary state is erased. This is a natural assumption that corresponds to the
fact that the tag is no longer powered by reader;
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4.LaunchðÞ: When the adversary queries this oracle, it means that it wants to
launch a new protocol instance. Therefore, the oracle returns to it a unique
identifier to be used with this protocol instance;
5.SendReader m, πð Þ: By this oracle, the adversary gets the reader’s answer when
the message m is sent to it as part of the protocol instance π. When m is the
empty message, abusively but suggestively denoted by ∅, this oracle outputs
the first message of the protocol instance π, assuming that the reader does the
first step in the protocol. We emphasize that the reader’s answer is conceived
as the message sent to the tag by the communication channel and not as the
reader’s decision output (tag identity or ⊥). Therefore, if the reader does not
send anything to the tag, the output of this oracle is empty;
6.SendTag m, vtagð Þ: This oracle outputs the tag’s answer when the message m is
sent to the tag referred to by vtag. When m is the empty message, this oracle
outputs the first message of the protocol instance π, assuming that the tag does
the first step in the protocol. As in the case of the SendReader oracle, we
emphasize that the tag’s answer is conceived as the message sent to the reader
by the communication channel and not as the tag’s decision output (OK or ⊥).
Therefore, if the tag does not send anything to the reader, the output of this
oracle is empty;
7.Result πð Þ: By this oracle, the adversary is allowed to know the reader’s decision
with respect to the authentication of the tag in session π. More precisely, the
oracle outputs ⊥ if in session π the reader has not yet made a decision on tag
authentication (this also includes the case when the session π does not exist), 1
if in session π the reader authenticated the tag, and 0 otherwise (this oracle is
both for unilateral and mutual authentication);
8.Corrupt vtagð Þ: This oracle outputs the current permanent (internal) state of
the tag referred to by vtag, when the tag is not involved in any computation of
any protocol step (that is, the permanent state before or after a protocol step).
It is customary to assume that the RFID tags can be corrupted to reveal not only
their permanent memory but also the global temporary variables [20]. When the
Corrupt oracle is considered in such a way, we will refer to Vaudenay’s model as
being Vaudenay’s model with temporary state disclosure. We emphasize that “corrup-
tion with temporary state disclosure” means corruption of the permanent state and
of the global temporary variables, but not of the local temporary variables (more
details are provided in Section 3.4).
Now, the adversaries are classified into the following classes, according to the
access they get to these oracles:
• Weak adversaries: they do not have access to the Corrupt oracle;
• Forward adversaries: if they access the Corrupt oracle, then they can only access
the Corrupt oracle;
• Destructive adversaries: after the adversary has queried Corrupt vtagð Þ and
obtained the corresponding information, the tag identified by vtag is destroyed
and the temporary identifier vtag wil no longer be available. The database DB
will still keep the record associated to this tag (the reader does not know the tag
was destroyed). As a consequence, a new tag with the same identifier cannot be
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created (in this approach, the database cannot store multiple records for the
same tag identifier);
• Strong adversaries: there are no restrictions on the use of oracles.
If we further restrict the adversary to access the Result oracle, we obtain four
new classes: narrow weak, narrow forward, narrow destructive, and narrow strong.
Now we are ready to introduce the tag and reader authentication properties as
proposed in [12, 13], simply called the security of RFID schemes.
An RFID scheme has the property of tag authentication if no strong adversary has
more than a negligible advantage in causing the reader to authenticate an
uncorrupted legitimate tag in a protocol instance where the reader had no conver-
sation with that tag to lead upon its authentication.
An RFID scheme has the property of reader authentication if no strong adversary
has more than a negligible advantage in causing an uncorrupted legitimate tag to
authenticate the reader in a protocol instance where the tag had no conversation
with the reader to lead upon its authentication.
Privacy in Vaudenay’s model generalizes anonymity (which means that the tag
ID cannot be inferred) and untraceability (which means that the equality of two
tags cannot be inferred). Thus, privacy requires that no adversary can infer non-
trivial tag ID relations from the protocol messages. The information provided by a
protocol is trivial when the adversary may learn it without making effective use of
the protocol messages. To formalize this, Vaudenay’s model introduces the concept
of a blinder that simulates the protocol for adversary without knowing any secret
information of the tags or the reader. If this simulation does not change the
adversary’s output compared to the case when the adversary plays with the real
protocol, then the protocol achieves privacy.
A blinder for an adversary A that belongs to some class V of adversaries is a PPT
algorithm B that:
1.simulates the Launch, SendReader, SendTag, and Result oracles for A, without
having access to the corresponding secrets;
2.passively looks at the communication between A and the other oracles
allowed to it by the class V (that is, B gets exactly the same information as A
when querying these oracles).
When the adversaryA interacts with the RFID scheme by means of a blinder B,
we say that A is blinded by B and denote this by AB. We emphasize that AB is
allowed to query the oracles Launch, SendReader, SendTag, and Result only by means
of B; all the other oracles are queried in the standard way.
Given an adversaryA, an RFID scheme S, and a blinder B, define the following
experiment (privacy game) that a challenger sets up for A:
Privacy experiment RFIDprv
A,S,B λð Þ
1: b 0, 1f g;
2: Set up the reader;
3: Ab gets the public key pk;
4: Ab queries the oracles;
5: Ab gets the secret table of the DrawTag oracle;
6: Ab outputs a bit b0;
7: Return 1 if b ¼ b0 and 0, otherwise,
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where A0 stands for A and A1 stands for AB.
An RFID scheme achieves privacy for a class V of adversaries if for any adver-
sary A ∈V there exists a blinder B such that A has a negligible advantage over 1=2
to distinguish between the real privacy game (the bit b is 0 in RFIDprv
A,S,B λð Þ) from the
blinded privacy game (the bit b is 1 in RFIDprv
A,S,B λð Þ).
We thus obtain eight concepts of privacy: strong privacy, narrow strong privacy,
destructive privacy, and so on. The diagram in Figure 2 shows the relationship
between the eight privacy concepts in Vaudenay’s model in the context of unilateral
authentication. In this diagram, “N-x” is a shortcut for “narrow x”. An arrow from
A to B means that A-privacy implies B-privacy.
3.3 Vaudenay’s model is a gray-box model
Let us take one last look at Vaudenay’s model to fit it into one of the three classes
presented at the beginning of Section 3. The attack model associated with it falls in
the class of gray-box models. Indeed, all the oracles except Result and Corrupt are
specific to the black-box model because they do not output anything about the
internal components of the algorithm implementation.
The Result oracle facilitates non-invasive side-channel analysis. Obviously, there
may be situations in which the adversary can see the final result of the reader (the
reader signals non-authentication of the tag, a gate opens, etc.). But, just as well, there
are situations in which the adversary cannot see the final result of the reader without
use of a specialized oracle. The analysis of Vaudenay’s model clearly shows that the
Result oracle makes a big difference between protocols that ensure privacy against an
adversary that has the possibility to use this oracle and protocols that ensure privacy
against an adversary that does not have the possibility to use this oracle.
The Corrupt oracle provides the adversary with information about the internal
memory of the tag. Although data stored in the internal memory of the tag (such as
symmetric keys, public keys) does not depend on implementation or platform, it is
internal information of the tag. The need for this oracle results from the fact that tags
are devices with poor physical protection. For low-cost tags, corruption could be
accomplished and thus the information stored in the permanent tag memory can be
retrieved. Temporary (volatile) memory loses its data when the power is interrupted.
However, the memory remanence effect may allow to recover some data. As a result,
we can say that it is natural to consider the possibility of obtaining the information from
the tag memory by various techniques called generically “corruption”. Once this infor-
mation is obtained, the analysis is a theoretical one, abstracting the implementation.
Figure 2.
Privacy and mutual authentication of RFID schemes in Vaudenay’s model without temporary state disclosure
(PKC stands for public-key cryptography and RO for random oracle).
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As a conclusion:
1.Vaudenay’s attack model falls in the category of gray-box models. It provides
the adversary with general information, including a limited amount of
side-channel information that does not depend on the implementation or
implementation platform;
2.Side-channel analysis that is not covered by Vaudenay’s model comes as an
additional analysis. It depends on the implementation of the protocol,
implementation platform, measuring devices, etc.
3.4 Corruption with temporary state disclosure
When Vaudenay’s model was proposed [13], it was somewhat unclear
whether the Corrupt oracle returns the full (i.e., permanent and temporary) tag
state or only the permanent one. This has also remained unclear in Paisie and
Vaudenay’s next year paper [12] on mutual authentication. While the distinction
between full and permanent state did not have a negative impact on the results
already obtained in the case of unilateral authentication, it highlighted several
wrong results in the case of mutual authentication [21]. Thus, one of the results in
[21], namely Theorem 1, says that there is no RFID scheme that achieves both
reader authentication and narrow forward privacy in Vaudenay’s model with tem-
porary state disclosure. The argument is as follows. Given a blinder B, one may
construct an adversary ABsec against reader authentication so that, if the scheme is
narrow forward private then ABsec has non-negligible advantage to authenticate
itself as a valid reader. Going inside the proof, we remark that it is crucial the
Corrupt oracle returns the full state of a tag in order to allow an adversary to
perform the test by which the tag authenticates the reader. By this test, the adver-
sary distinguishes with non-negligible probability between the real privacy game
and the blinded one.
4. Physically unclonable functions
Purely cryptographic and mathematical techniques can provide security in a
black-box or partially gray-box model. As we argued in the previous section,
Vaudenay’s model is a gray-box model. Within this model, no RFID scheme is
known, built only on symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic primitives, which
would offer destructive privacy. No one has indeed proved the non-existence of
such a scheme, but we firmly believe that there is no such scheme. However, if we
add physical security objects to the RFID schemes, then we can obtain RFID
schemes that are destructive private [22].
Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) are possible candidates that can provide
physical security in that they can ensure the secure generation and storage of the
cryptographic keys [5–7]. A PUF can be seen as a physical object that evaluates a noisy
functions: when queried with a challenge x it generates a response y that depends on
both x and its unique and specific properties which are hard to clone. The PUFs are
noisy because their specific properties can change with the operating conditions
such as supply voltage or ambient temperature. So, PUFs may return slightly
different responses when queried with the same challenge multiple times.
During the last years, the PUF concept attracted the attention of the research
community and industry. Many research papers and patents focusing on
10
Cryptography - Recent Advances and Future Developments
implementing distinct PUF architectures, larger systems employing PUFs as
separate units or protocols dedicated to PUF-based implementations were
proposed.
4.1 PUF construction
In principle, PUFs can be constructed with any physical entity or structure as
long as an intrinsic mismatching or nonlinear behavior, inherent to such entity
when implementing multiple alike, could be exploited.
For instance, two identical transistors designed in the same technology and on
the same mask will show slightly different performances after implementing their
layout (real physical circuit). The main difference will be noticed for the threshold
voltage, VTH in the case of CMOS process, different for both transistors. As such, a
simple CMOS PUF could be obtained when implementing an array of identical
transistors, this being also the first architecture reported in literature for chip
identification [23] and disclosed in a patent application filed in 1989 [24]. Based on
how challenges are applied to the circuit input and the great number of distinct
responses (keys) that can be obtained, this particular PUF architecture is a strong
PUF, at least according to PUF properties reiterated in [25]. A similar approach,
yet implemented with bipolar transistors, was disclosed in a European patent
application filed in 2013 [26].
Another example, even simpler, is that of a discrete electronic part, be it
through-hole or surface-mount resistor or capacitor. It is well known that there are
no two identical resistors or capacitors even though they have, theoretically, the
same value and tolerance and are produced by the same manufacturer. Tolerance
gives us valuable information about how much less or more the resistance or
capacitance value is different of its nominal value. This sort of uncertainty favors
PUF applications even though is not good from design perspective. And this is how
the first RC PUF came into existence [27, 28].
Looking back, many PUF architectures have been proposed during the last
two decades, various intrinsic properties being exploited, with many distinct
classes identified [25]. This field encompasses so many implementations,
technologies and design principles that two different perspectives to classify
PUF architectures were used in that review. However, taking into account
the scope and field of our study, i.e. RFID, we consider that the second
classification (PUF tree), based on mechanism and evaluation parameter, is
more relevant. In this regard, the PUF implementations fall into four classes:
electronic, optical, radio frequency and magnetic PUFs. Furthermore, since
RFID tags have limited chip area and (power) design constraints, it is obvious
that electronic PUF architectures, known also as silicon-PUF, are of interest for
our study.
Silicon-based PUFs involve conventional integrated circuit design techniques.
Two essential design hints are identified regarding the implementation of a
particular silicon-based PUF architecture:
1.A PUF architecture should generate at its output a unique sequence, useful
either for authentication or cryptographic key generation, developed based on
silicon intrinsic (physical) particularities. Therefore, no memory cells are
allowed to store such a (PUF response) sequence. However, a (SRAM or
DRAM) memory cell could be used to implement a PUF cell and thus generate
a single bit of the PUF response because we are not interested in the binary
value memorized in that cell but rather of the transition speed and delay,
which are specific to that particular cell;
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2.When it comes to intrinsic behavior, PUF construction starts either at
transistor or system level. In the first case, it exploits certain anomalies in
transistor functionality that could identify a particular circuit similar to a
fingerprint, such implementation being reported in some references as analog
PUF. In the second case, it uses specific differences that appear when
connecting identical logic gates, as it is the case of ring oscillators or SRAM/
DRAM cells array. In such implementation, the randomness property is based
on intrinsic variations, at gate level, but the property is exploited and adjusted
by digital designers in such manner that the spread of generated patterns
(responses) is extended as much as possible. This is the reason why, such class
of PUF architectures is reported in literature as digital PUF. The system-level
approach favors FPGA based PUF implementations, the FPGA having all
digital gates already manufactured, hence it lacks access to the transistor level.
The most part of the PUF articles published during the last decade make use of
FPGA. Either way, silicon PUF implementation is uniquely favored by the
tolerance inherent to manufacturing process, the leading cause of device
mismatching. It seems that what deteriorates the real performances of a
particular silicon product, becomes quite useful for chip identification/cloning
detection and key generation.
Silicon PUFs are still the most appealing ones because they occupy a very small
chip area, especially when implemented in smaller technologies (¡65 nm CMOS
process), therefore they can be integrated into larger electronic units and systems
(such as RFID). In addition, their design and preliminary testing on FPGA devel-
opment boards ensure their proof of concept reproducibility, feasibility and suc-
cess, before going deeper to implement a dedicated chip. A selection of
representative silicon PUF architectures reported in literature is given below (for
more details the reader may consult [6, 20, 29]):
2000: Threshold voltage (TV) PUF [24];
2002: Ring oscilator (RO) PUF [30];
2004: Arbiter PUF (APUF) [31];
2007: SRAM PUF [32], LATCH PUF [33];
2008: Butterfly (B) PUF [34], D Flip-Flop (DFF) PUF [35];
2009: Power distribution (PD) PUF [36], CNN PUF [37];
2010: Super High Information Content (SHIC) PUF [38], Glitch PUF [39];
2011: Pseudo-LFSR (PL) PUF [40];
2012: Buskeeper PUF [41];
2013: Micro-electrico-mechanical system (MEMS) PUF [42];
2014: Transient effect RO (TERO) PUF [43];
2015: Dynamic random access memory (DRAM) PUF [44], SA_PUF [?];
2016: D-PUF [45];
2017: Aging-resistant Current-starved RO (ACRO) PUF [46];
2018: Cryptanalysis/Robust Multiplexer-based PUF (cMPUF/rMPUF) [47].
4.2 Cryptographic properties of PUFs and idealization
In cryptography and security we typically build a cryptographic system and
prove its security under the assumption that we have used secure ingredients
(building blocks) such as collision-resistant hash functions (CRHF), pseudo-random
generators (PRGs), or pseudo-random functions (PRFs). These secure ingredients are
a kind of “ground truth” of applied cryptography. “Provable security” typically
starts only above the level of these secure ingredients. A proof based on
12
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experiments and simulations may only show that the scheme is secure with respect
to those experiments and simulations. A proof based on ideal primitives has a major
advantage: if a cryptographic primitive is assumed ideal and later is proved (by
experiments) insecure, we may change it by another one of the same type that we
believe is secure. The entire scheme remains unchanged and the security analyses is
moved to the cryptographic primitives.
When a cryptographic construction is deployed in practice, the secure (ideal)
primitives that underlie it are replaced by algorithms for which we do not have a
theoretical proof of security. Instead, these algorithms are subjected to intense
scrutiny by cryptographers to see if they resist all known classes of attacks and to
get evidence supporting the assumption that they are secure.
PUFs have been introduced to physically supplement specific security properties
that cannot be satisfactorily obtained at the software implementation level alone. The
security properties offered by PUFs can only be highlighted through experiments and
simulations. To be able to apply provable security to cryptographic constructions that
include PUFs, it is necessary to formalize their security properties. The major problem
that arises in this context is to maintain a balance between formalization and the real
physical properties. The difficulty of maintaining this balance comes from the fact that
it is quite challenging to capture the behavior of a physical object through a mathe-
matical formula that is accurate or that approximates it well enough. Without such a
balance, we can reach situations such as those in which either the formalization is not
useful or is too strict and has no practical equivalent. As a result, the formalization
must be sufficiently realistic and, at the same time, allow its use in provable security.
Among the basic properties we want from a PUF class we mention: [left=.5cm]
Constructability – this means that it is “easy” to construct a random instance of
a given PUF class;
Evaluability – this includes constructability and further requires that any ran-
dom instance of a given PUF class can be easily evaluated on any random challenge;
Reproductibility – this includes evaluability and further requires that the
responses resulting from evaluating the same challenge on the same PUF instance
should be similar (in some distance metric) with high probability;
Uniqueness – this includes evaluability and further requires that the responses
resulting from evaluating the same challenge on different PUF instances should be
dissimilar (in some distance metric) with high probability;
Identifiability – this means both reproducibility and uniqueness;
Physical unclonability – this includes evaluability and further requires that it is
hard to create a new PUF instance that is more alike to a given PUF instance than
expressed by the uniqueness property;
Unpredictability – this means evaluability and further requires that no PPT
algorithm can predict the answer of a given PUF instance for a given challenge, except
with negligible probability, even if it could have previously learned the PUF’s answer
for a polynomial number of challenges (different from the challenge in question);
One-wayness – this includes evaluability and further requires that it is hard to
invert the answer of a given PUF instance;
Tamper-evidence – this includes evaluability and further requires that it is hard
to physically alter a given PUF instance without having a noticeable effect on its
challenge-response behavior.
The choice of the PUF type to be included in a cryptographic system depends on
the security properties we want to achieve, and which cannot be obtained through
software techniques, as well as on the production costs. For example, the tamper-
evidence feature can be handy for constructing destructive private RFID schemes.
However, today’s technological development shows that only optical [48] and coat-
ing PUFs [49] can provide this property. Besides, such PUFs have high production
13
Security and Privacy of PUF-Based RFID Systems
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.94018
costs, which requires a careful analysis of the environment of the utilization of the
RFID schemes that would use such PUFs.
5. PUF-based RFID systems
PUFs have proven to be suitable for integration into RFID systems to ensure
their security in gray or white box models. So far, two significant directions for the
use of PUFs in RFID systems have emerged. We dedicate this section to a discussion
of the two directions and the issues that arise regarding them.
5.1 Endowing RFID tags by PUFs
The vulnerability of RFID systems to corruption consists in the fact that an
adversary with corruption abilities can extract the information from the tag’s mem-
ory and, thus, can impersonate it or, at least, destroy the privacy property. Without
having a concrete proof at the moment, the researchers’ opinion is that, in
Vaudenay’s model but not only, destructive privacy cannot be achieved only by
using symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic primitives. Storing a private key in
the tag’s memory is useless when the adversary has corruption capabilities and can
use the information obtained through corruption. The use of a public key system in
which the private key is stored on the reader side is also useless in Vaudenay’s model
when destructive privacy is desired.
This discussion naturally leads to the idea of using a tamper-evident mechanism
embedded in the tag to help the process of identifying and authenticating it. In this
context, PUFs seem to be a good choice and the newest technologies show that it is
possible to embed PUFs into tags. These kind of tags, with PUFs embedded into
them, will be called PUF tags, while the standard tags will sometimes be referred to
as ordinary tags. A PUF-based RFID scheme is an RFID scheme with PUF tags.
How PUF tags can be built can be very important in terms of tag corruption.
This aspect will be touched on in the next section.
Two significant directions have emerged on the authentication protocol of PUF-
based RFID schemes. The first direction treats PUFs as fingerprints [50–54]. This
approach requires an initial configuration phase in which a PUF model or a large set
of PUF challenge-and-response (CR) pairs is pre-computed and stored in the
reader’s database. To identify a PUF tag, the reader queries it by some challenge, the
tag evaluates its PUF on the challenge, and then the reader compares the tag’s
response with the pre-computed response it already has stored in the database.
There are several variants of this scenario, but regardless of these, special attention
must be paid to the modeling attacks of PUFs [55]. This is because the adversary
might get sufficient CR pairs in order to simulate the tag’s PUF. Anyway, the
authors of this paper are not aware of any PUF-based RFID schemes based on this
approach, and that would provide destructive privacy in Vaudenay’s model. More-
over, we believe that it is not possible to achieve this level of privacy through this
approach because the set of CR pairs is generally polynomial in size. Then, a strong
enough adversary may run the authentication protocol with a tag until it exhausts
all CR pairs stored in the database. In such a situation, either a CR pair will be
reused, or a reset mechanism has to be used. Regardless of the case, the privacy
property might be compromised.
A second direction for the authentication protocol of PUF-based RFID schemes
starts from the idea of using PUFs as cryptographic key generators or as storage
methods [10, 22, 56, 57]. That is, the tag evaluates its PUF only to generate or
extract a cryptographic key. Thus, the PUF is evaluated for a minimum number of
challenges. This fact eliminates the shortcoming that the adversary can model the
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PUF, but if the PUF is noisy, then an additional overhead may be incurred by using
fuzzy extractors. Assuming PUFs are tamper-evident, this second approach pro-
duces schemes that achieve destructive privacy in Vaudenay’s model (please see
Section 5.3).
5.2 Tag corruption and PUFs
In order to adapt Vaudenay’s model (with or without temporary state disclosure)
to PUF-based RFID schemes, we have to clarify what corruption means in this case.
At least two main scenarios are possible:
1.By corrupting a PUF tag, the adversary gets the state of the tag, according to
the type of the attack model (with or without temporary state disclosure).
Besides, the tag is destroyed, but its PUF can still be evaluated. This variant
does not show significant differences compared to the case of corruption of
ordinary tags, because the PUF of the tag can now be seen as a public function
that the adversary can evaluate as he wishes;
2.By corrupting a PUF tag, the adversary gets the state of the tag, according to
the type of the attack model (with or without temporary state disclosure).
Besides, the tag and its PUF are destroyed (in this case, the PUF cannot
anymore be evaluated).
The second scenario is the most significant. Within it, the PUF tag is seen as
a tamper-evident device (circuit), such as a tamper-evident PUF [58, 59].
Working in this scenario, Theorem 1 in [21], at least in its present form, cannot
be applied to PUF-based RFID schemes. This leaves open the invitation to
PUF-based design RFID schemes that achieve mutual authentication and higher
privacy levels than narrow forward in Vaudenay’s model with temporary state
disclosure. As we have already said, such schemes cannot be based on ordinary
tags. A good choice is to use PUF tags, as it was done in [10, 22, 56, 57, 60].
However, the use of PUF tags does not mean that the schemes are immune to
corrupting adversaries. This is because an adversary might not need the entire tag
state to attack the scheme. An example in this sense is provided in [10] where it was
shown that the RFID schemes proposed in [56, 57] do not achieve mutual authenti-
cation and (narrow) destructive privacy in Vaudenay’s model with temporary state
disclosure, as it was claimed by authors, although they use PUF tags. The proof
exploits the fact that these schemes use volatile variables to carry values between
protocol steps.
As we have seen, the corruption attack in Vaudenay’s model may provide the
adversary with the full state of the tag. However, this state does not include the values
of the local temporary variables. The varied range of side-channel attacks includes
other types of attacks, such as those called cold-boot attacks, through which the tag’s
memory can be frozen. Thus the adversary can obtain the value of the local variables
at a given time. This type of attack has also been discussed in RFID-oriented papers,
such as [56, 57, 61]. We are not aware of any formal treatment of this scenario in
Vaudenay’s model. To implement it in Vaudenay’s model, the Corrupt oracle should
be changed to return snapshots of the tag’s state during its computation (recall that
the standard Corrupt oracle returns the tag’s state before or after a protocol step). A
formal and complete treatment of such a corruption seems hard to reach; on the other
side, such a corruption is very strong and probably no PUF-based RFID scheme may
achieve a privacy level higher than (narrow) weak under such a corruption. How-
ever, special cases may be relevant. One of them is the cold boot attack mentioned
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above [56, 57, 61]. To defeat it, a PUF double evaluation technique was proposed in
[61], which consists of two evaluations in a row of the same PUF. If the attack is
applied immediately after the first PUF evaluation, the second PUF evaluation is lost,
and vice-versa. This technique was implemented in [56, 57] too. Unfortunately, the
authors did not pay much attention to the temporary variables, which made their
schemes not to achieve even the narrow forward privacy level [10].
5.3 Destructive privacy by PUF-based RFID schemes
When the Vaudenay [12, 13] model was proposed, finding an RFID scheme to
provide destructive privacy remained an open issue (please see the diagram in
Figure 2). This problem was later solved by a PUF-based RFID scheme [22, 60].
The scheme, which provides unilateral authentication, is obtained from the PRF-
based RFID scheme presented in Section 2, adding tamper-evident PUFs to tags to
generate the key K. If the adversary corrupts the tag, its PUF is destroyed and
cannot be evaluated. Thus, the adversary cannot get the key K. The scheme was
extended later to ensure mutual authentication [10]. We present it in Figure 3. As
one can see, the main difference between the scheme in Figure 1 and this new one is
that the domain of the PRF function F is extended with one more bit and the tag is
endowed with a tamper-evident PUF P and a seed s for it. Whenever the tag needs
to evaluate its PRF, it first computes the key K ¼ P sð Þ and then uses it. It has to be
understood that after using it, the variable K is erased. If the adversary corrupts the
tag, the seed s he gets is useless because the PUF can no longer be evaluated (please
see [10] for details regarding the security and privacy proofs).
As corruption with temporary state disclosure is a real threat in practice, the
most natural question is how to extend the above schemes, or how to design new
ones, secure and private in Vaudenay’s model under such a corruption. It is clear
that ordinary tags (i.e., tags that only implement cryptographic primitives) do not
help if one wants to achieve both mutual authentication and privacy (Theorem 1 in
[21]). Endowing tags with PUFs is a potential solution but it is not a guarantee. It
turns out that the subtlety is how to use temporary variables. This has been missed
in some recently proposed RFID schemes [56, 57], which made these schemes not to
achieve the privacy level claimed by authors [10]. It seems that the use of tempo-
rary variables in connection with mutual authentication and privacy is not really
very well understood, especially under corruption with temporary state disclosure.
Figure 3.
PRF- and PUF-based RFID scheme that achieves destructive privacy and mutual authentication
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6. Conclusions
The significant impact of PUF technology in the construction of RFID systems is
demonstrated by the great diversity of scientific articles and patents proposed in the
last decade. The use of PUFs in the construction of RFID schemes can bring extra
security and privacy at the physical level that cannot be obtained by symmetric and
asymmetric cryptography at the moment. However, this requires an adequate
understanding and analysis of security and privacy models for RFID to consider
PUFs only if existing standard techniques cannot lead to the desired security and
privacy level. Unfortunately, the literature shows us enough PUF-based RFID
schemes proposed in recent years that do not even reach the weak privacy level in
Vaudenay’s model. In contrast, weak privacy in this model can be achieved through
standard RFID schemes that use only symmetric cryptography. This fact clearly
shows that a sustained effort is needed to consolidate the understanding of the
concept of security and privacy model and adapt it accordingly to PUF technology.
In this chapter, we highlighted the aspects mentioned above and emphasized the
need to use formal models in the study of security and privacy properties of (PUF-
based) RFID schemes. Achieving the level of destructive privacy in Vaudenay’s
model through PUF-based RFID schemes clearly shows us the potential of using
PUF technology in the construction of RFID systems. Even if the security and
privacy proofs on PUF-based RFID schemes make use of ideal PUFs, this is not a
negative aspect as long as there is practically reasonable support for idealization,
and this is in the trend of technology evolution.
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